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I 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VERN FRAILEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, l 
JOHN C. :;~GARRY, ~ Case No. 2506 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELiniiNARY STATE1iENT 
The statement of the case as set forth in appellant's 
brief sets forth some of the material provisions of the 
contract sought to be rescinded by appellant, and dis-
cusses briefly the pleadings, findings, conclusions, deci-
sion of the court and judgment.. Plaintiff's assignments 
of error do not attack any of the findings, and conse-
quently none of the eYidence is set forth or discussed in 
the appellant's brief. The respondent by cross-assign-
ment of error 'vill attnek Conclusion of Ija'v No. 1 that 
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2 
the contract between appellant and respondent was sub-
ject to rescission because of misrepresentation by the re: 
spondent as to the availability of water for irrigation of 
the lands, and in discussing this cross-assignment of 
error will later in this brief discuss the evidence applic-
able thereto. 
However, respondent believes it will be more orderly 
and convenient, both to court and counsel, to first answer 
the contentions of the appellant as they appear in appel-
lant's brief, and then set forth the respondent's cross-
assignments oi error and discuss the same. If this Hon-
orable Court should agree with the trial court's conclu-
sions of law to the effect that the contract in question is 
not' now subject to rescission and that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to any relief under his amended complaint, then 
it is not necessary to consider or determine or rule upon 
the respondent's cross-assignments of error. 
A.RGUMENT 
The trial court sustained the respondent's motion to 
strike that portion of paragraph 8 of the amended com-
plaint commencing with the word "and" on line eight 
and continuing through to and including the word 
"monopoly" at the end of subdivision (1) of said para-
graph. The motion is at page 27 of the judgment roll, 
paragraph 1 thereof. At the commencement of the trial 
the court reinstated such portion of paragraph 9 (Tr. 2). 
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\Vhether or not the court erred in striking such portion 
of the complaint, or erred thereafter in _reinstating the 
same, is of no importance "~hatever, because there is no 
proof to sustain such allegations and there are no find-
ings of fact pursuant to such allegations. The portion 
of the complaint in question alleges tliat on a number of 
occasions prior to the execution of the contract the defend-
ant attempted to file applications to appropriate water 
in the office of the state engineer to irrigate the lands in 
question; that his applications had been denied by the 
state engineer because there was not sufficient 'vater 
available to irrigate the lands and because permitting 
the defendant to make such applications would be against 
public policy and for the purpose of securing· to the de-
fendant a monopoly. The only possible purpose of such 
alleg·ations would be to show that the defendant had 
knowledge that the applications of plaintiff would not 
be allowed. The only evidence in the entire record con-
cerning the rejection of any applications to appropriate 
water in the Beryl underground district is found at page 
120 and 123 of the reporter's transcript. 1\fr. Ward, dep-
uty state engineer, was testifying on direct and follow-
i ng is the extent of such testimony : 
Q. Do you haYe in mind any particular filing made 
there that 'vas rejected~ 
A. No, not in recent years. I have never rejected 
anv in that area that I recall, but prior to my 
ti~e there 'vere some filings I think were filed 
in the namr of !Carla Louise J\!IcGarry that 
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were rejected. 
Q. Do you know .. what relation she bears to Mr. 
McGarry~ 
A. No~ definitely. I have always assumed - -
Q. Do you know the husband's name of this Mrs. 
l\icGarry~ 
A. I have understood that he was Ambrose Mc-
Garry. 
MR. HANSEN : I don't suppose you deny he is a 
brother of John C. McGarry'! If material~ 
MR. CLINE: If there is any materiality in it, I 
wouldn't deny it, no. 
MR. HANSEN: I don't know that _there is any ma-
teriality in it. (Tr. 120-12-1). 
Q. I don't quite gather.J Mr. Ward, whether you 
. stated that in recent years at least"" so far as 
you know, there have been no applications that 
have been filed for water in the Beryl area that 
have been rejected by your office. · 
A. I don't recall of any. 
Q. And the one application to which you .refer 
was made how many years ago approximately~ 
A. I don't know the filing date .. When I arrived 
in the State Engineer's office in -1941 I was 
given the responsibility of answering some of 
the letters pertaining to these files after the 
application had been rejected. 
Q. So that there have been no rejections of any 
water applications at least between 1941 and up 
to the time when these applications of Mr. 
Frailey and 1\tfr. Thompson 'vere filed in De-
cember, 1945 f 
A. I don't recall any that have been rejected. 
(Trans. 123). 
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The record not only shows affirmatively that no 
"\Vater application~ or filings "\Yere rejected after a single 
rejection in 1941, but fails to sho'v '"·hy that application 
"'"as rejected. There is a complete absence of proof that 
any application mnde by defendant 'vas rejected and 
there is a complete absence of proof that the state engi-
neer ever reje(!ted an application for the reason that to 
appro\'"e it would create a monopoly or would be against 
public policy. 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS 
XOT AGAINS·T PUBLIC POLICY 
Respondent confesses an- utter and complete inabil-
ity to follow appellant's reasoning "\vhen he argues that 
the contract is against public policy. 
It seems that the appellant contends that the contract 
is against public policy because the defendant was making 
an unconscionable profit out of public waters and created 
a monopoly of public waters in favor of the respondent. 
At the outset it may 'vell be observed, and appellant 
seems to overlook, that it was he who made the applica-
tions for water and not the respondent. Respondent 
claims the water through and under the appellant by rea-
son of the contract. The appellant could contract with 
reference to water applications he was to make before or 
after executing the agreement; and could, for that mat-
ter, contract to sell, rent or otherwise deal 'vith the same. 
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If the water applications were not tainted with specula-
tion or monopoly when appellant made the applications, 
ho"\\r could they become tainted thereafter because of 
appellant's disposition of them' Appellant argues that 
the applications for water made by him were not tainted 
with monopoly and speculation when he made them but 
thereafter would become tainted if the ;respondent ulti-
mately acquired them. He contends that he can enter 
into a contract to purchase land, thereafter make appli-
cations to appropriate "rater for irrigation thereof, and 
this his own applications create a monopoly in favor of 
respondent and for that reason give rise to a right to 
rescind-and this when respondent gets the water only 
in the event of a default by appellant. 
However, even though respondent made the applica-
tions, which is not the fact, he contends there "\\rould be no 
element of monopoly or spec"ulation and the contract 
would not be void as against public policy. 
It is elementary that the rules which hold a contract 
void as against public policy should not be unduly extend-
ed; that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in 
their freedom to make their own contracts and that courts 
should act cautiously and not hold contracts void as being 
contrary to public policy unless they are clearly and un-
mistakably so. Certainly there is no presumption that 
a contract is against public policy unless it so appears 
from the face and provisions of the contract. 
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I 
Section 100-3-8 rr. C .• 4.. 1943, provides: 
''It shall be the duty of the state engineer, upon 
the payment of the approval fee to approve an ap-
plication if * * * 4. The applicant has the finan-
cial ability to complete the proposed works and the 
application "~as filed in good faith and not for the 
purpose of speculation or monopoly.'' 
By this legislative enactment the state engineer is re-
quired to approve an application if, among· other things, 
the application 'v-as filed in g·ood faith and not for the pur-
pose of speculation or monopoly. The statute does not 
define what is speculation or what is monopoly. We as-
sume the terms are used in their ordinary sense. In the 
first place, the state engineer has not refused to ,approve 
any of the applications in question for any such ·reasons. 
Secondly, is the application for sufficient water to irri-
gate a section of land, and the granting of sufficient well 
rights for that purpose the creation of a monopoly~ 
Thirly, does the statute conte:rp.plate that _procuring and 
using water for the irrigation of arid land, and the re-
sultant enhancement of values because of the water is 
such a monopoly and speculation and prohibited~ Fourth-
ly, is the application by plaintiff for well rights to irri-
gate land which he is purchasing, the creation of a monop-
oly and a speculation~ And may this court determine 
such matter in a collateral proceeding or is the right to 
deter1nine whether an application creates a monopoly or 
is made for speculation left to the determination of the 
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~tate engineer? 
Respondent insists that there is no evidence of 
monopoly or speculation in the record because he did not 
make the water applications and even had he done so, 
there is still no such evidence of monopoly or speculation 
as is contemplated by the statute. 
The appellant further argues that the contract is 
against public policy and void because respondent was 
making an unconscionable profit out of public waters. 
Without doubt the evidence shows and the trial court 
found that the land without water was worth $1~50 per 
acre, and when water is available for irrigation the land 
was worth $30.00 per acre. Such evidence was admitted 
over the objection of the plaintiff (Tr. 121-123), the ob-
jection being that such evidence was immaterial and ir-
relevant and not -within the issues. 'V e are not assigning 
error respecting· such ruling because even though the evi-
dence stands it can have no bearing on the legal prob-
lems presented by this appeal. 
There is nothing whatsoever in the record to sho\Y 
\Vhat price defendant paid for the land. Plaintiff admits 
that the price paid by defendant is not made to appear. 
Defendant was on the stand in the trial of this cause and 
no attempt was made by appellant to elicit this informa-
tion. The record shows 1880 acres of land of 'vhich the 
land described in the contract wae a part, was sold by 
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an estate to defendant's predecessor in interest for $1.50 
per acre. The record does not show how much addi-
tional defendant's predecessor in interest may have paid 
out in expenses in checking record, checking on the land, 
negotiating· the purchase, etc. The record does not show 
what profit he made when he sold to defendant. The rec-
ord does not show whether the 960 acres sold to plaintiff 
was the cream of the land and what value could be placed 
on the remaining land. The record does not show what 
profit defendant made fr~m_ the sale of the land, even 
assuming the matter of profit is material. All the rec-
ord does show is that 1880 acres of which the land in 
question is a part is worth $1.50 without 'vater and $30.00 
with water-all of which was known to the plaintiff when 
he entered into the contract. Plaintiff. made no attempt 
to show what prices are being asked by owners of other 
and similar adjoining· premises for the same type of land, 
"'"ithout \Vater. He is attempting to move the well rights 
for the irrigation of other land which he has purchased, 
but fails to state what he actually paid for this other land. 
We have never understood that a large profit en-
titled a vendee under a contract to rescind. But appel-
lant argues that the large profit came from the public 
\raters. ....\_s pointed out previously, the appellant as a 
\Tendee made the water applications and not the respon-
dent. Any profit made was from the sale of the land.and 
not from the public w .. aters, 'vhich respondent now claim~ 
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by virtue of a contract. In effect the right to the \Vater 
in the event of a forfeiture of the contract was in the na-
ture of so much additional security for the faithful per-
-formance of the contract. However, respondent submits 
that even though he himself had applied for the water 
and sold the land and water for $30.00 per acre, still 
there is nothing objectionable and appellant could not 
rescind. Respecting profit, it is further pointed out that 
without evidence of the cost of the sale, and expenses in 
connection with his procuring the land and the price 
which he paid, this court cannot even find there was any 
profit, much less an unconscionable profit. 
We cannot follow the appellant's reasoning in insist-
ing that by the contract the defendant seeks to change the 
laws of the state because the contract provides that water ..... . 
represented by applications shall be: considered appurte-
nant to the land. It is true, of course, this Court has held 
that water represented by an application to appropriate, 
(until the well has been drilled), is not appurtenant to 
the premises. But this court has never held that parties 
may not by contract make such water rights appp.rtenant. 
This court has held that certain permanent improvements 
made on realty become appurtenant, and that certain im-
provements not of a permanent character do not become 
appurtenant. But this court has never held that the par-
ties may not by contract, as between themselves, agree 
that certain improvements shall or shall not become ap-
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' 
purtenant. 
'': e also point out that it is immaterial whether the 
"\Vater under the contract becomes appurtenant to the land. 
The contract provides as follows : 
"It is agreed that in the event the buyer or any 
assignee shall make application to appropriate 
" ... ater or shall procure a certificate of appropriation 
to appropriate· water or shall procure a certificate 
to appropriate water from wells located upon the 
said premises and said buyer or assignee or as-
signees shall thereafter default in this contract, the 
seller shall immediately become the assignee of any 
such application or appropriation and the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized 
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any such 
application and in the event a certificate of approp-
riation has issued to the said buyer, the water rights 
thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to 
the said premises and in the event of default, the 
title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller." 
The agreement is that the seller, in the event -of a 
default, shall become the assignee of any water applica-
tion and the water rights shall be considered as a ppurte-
nant "and in the event of a default, the title thereto shall 
immediately pass to the seller." In order for the respon-
dent, after default, to become entitled to the water appli-
ration it is not necessary for the water to be considered 
as appurtenant, although we do not recede from our po-
sition that it does become so under the contract. Title 
can pass under and by virtue of the contractual provision 
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that the seller on default became the assignee; and can 
pass under and by virtue of the provision that title 
thereto shall pass immediately to the seller-and we add, 
regardless whether the water application is or is not ap-
purtenant. And the trial court could award the \Vater 
application to the seller by virtue of the contractual pro-
vision that ''in the event of default, the title thereto shall 
immediately pass to the seller'' as well as by virtue of 
the provision that ''the seller shall immediately become 
the assignee of any such application or appropriation," 
and as well as by virtue of the provision that ''the water 
rights thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to 
the said premises.'' 
Moreover, if the defendant lived up to his con-
tractual obligations, the title to the land and the \Vater 
rights would eventually pass to him and he would become 
the sole owner thereof. Certainly there is nothing against 
public policy in such an agreement. But, argues the plain-
tiff, i~ he fails to perform under the contract and by the 
violation of his own contractual obligations permits the 
title to the water to pass to the defendant, then the con-
tract is against public policy. Plaintiff further argues 
that nevertheless he should end up with title to the \Vater. 
This is indeed a weird legal theory. 
Complaint is made by appellant that the court award-
ed the defendant the applications to appropriate water 
filed by Jerold E. Thompson, w·ho is not a party to the 
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action. 
Plaintiff commenced the suit asking· for a rescission 
of the contract and that it be declared null and void, and 
that plaintiff be a-w,arded $2600.00 credited as a down pay-
ment. The cros-s-complaint filed by defendant prayed 
that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint and that the 
contract be declared to have been breached by plaintiff 
and to be in default and declared cancelled and forfeited. 
The judgment decrees that the contract is not sub-
ject to any rescission by the plaintiff and that he take 
nothing by reason of his amended complaint; and further 
decrees that plaintiff has defaulted in and breached the 
contract and declared the same to be forfeited and ter-
minated. The pleadings and issues involved do not neces-
sitate that the court decree the water filings made in the 
name of Thompson did not belong to the plaintiff but be-
longed to Thompson. As a matter of fact the water ap-
plications or filings do not belong to Thompson and were 
not intended to be the property of Thompson. 
Thompson testified -that in the discussion between 
Frailey and McGarry h_e was to work into the deal and 
have an interest in the land; that there was some doubt 
as to ho\V the state engineer might feel abo~t one man 
applying for nine wells and inasmuch as Frailey wanted 
Thompson to get started there they decided ''to put five 
"'rlls in my name, four pretty good sized wells and one 
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smaller well." ( Tr. 7 4-7 5). He testified also that since 
he did not have any money to put up Frailey assumed the 
financial obligation of the deal 'vith the understanding or 
verbal agreement that he would work along on a salary 
and a bonus and a portion of the bonus would apply on 
what Frailey wanted to give him; that when he paid back 
enough money he was to be given 250 acres of ground, 
including the water, and therefore he signed the \Vater 
applications. ( Tr. 75). 
Frailey testified that he made about half of the ap-
plications to his brother-in-law Thompson, who was there 
during the negotiations and who 'vitnessed the contract; 
that he told Thompson that as they developed the ground 
he would sell Thompson a piece of the· land ''and allow 
him one or two wells.'' That at the time the contract 
was signed Thompson was 'vorking for Frailey (Tr. 
12-13). Frailey also testified that in the event Thompson 
did not purchase any of the ground he (Frailey) pre-
sumed the wells would be his. (Tr. 40); that Thompson 
was present during much of the discussions bet,veen 
Frailey and McG~rry and \vitnessed the contract (Tr. 40). 
It is alleged in paragraph 1 of the affirmatiYe de-
fense set forth in the ans,ver (R. 33) that Thompson \vas 
well aware of the terms of the agreement and was inter-
ested in the purchase of the premises and was to receiYr 
a title to a portion thereof, and by the reply and ans\Yer 
of plaintiff thereto (R. 38-39) it is admitted there \Yn~ 
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an oral understanding that if sufficient water to irrigate 
the lan4 'vas secured, and if and when plaintff acquired 
title to said lands, plaintiff would sell some of the lands 
to Thompson but that Thompson no longer claims any 
interest in the contract. 
There can be no question but that the water filings 
made in Thompson's name 'vere for the benefit of plain-
tiff and that plaintiff was the real party in interest and 
the equitable owner thereof; that Thompson knew of 
the provisions of the contract making the defendant as-
signee of water filings made to irrigate the lands in case 
of default. At the trial of this case Thompson did not 
contend he was the owner of the water filings and under 
all the facts and circumstances cannot now successfully 
so contend. Not being a party to the suit the court was 
under no duty to declare such holding·s belonged to Thomp-
son or to declare otherwise. The court made its finding 
No. 7 (R. 72) that about half of the applications were put 
... in Thompson's name because he was going to purchase 
some of the premises ; that Thompson was to purchase 
250 acres of land and have water to irrigate such land; 
that he was a witness to the contract and was well aware 
of the terms of the agreement and was interested in the 
agreement. 
Since Frailey put some of the applications in Thomp-
son's name, (particularly with Thompson's full knowl-
edge of the provisions of the contract pertaining to water 
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being made appurtenant to the land) the court properly 
could require Frailey to procure Thompson's assignment 
of those water filings as a condition to decreeing a rescis-
sion of the contract. It would seem strange that Frailey 
could make applications in Thompson's name, and not be 
required to get Thompson's assignments as a condition 
precedent to a rescission of the contract. 
THE TRIAI.J COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING 
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
By plaintiff's second cause of action he claims the 
right to rescind the contract because it is alleged the plain-
tiff requested the defendant to furnish an abstract or 
polic-y of title insurance and defendant failed so to do. 
There is no allegation that the. plaintiff tendered the bal-
ance due under the terms of the contract. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to that cause of action. 
T~e contract provides : 
"The seller, on receiving the pay1ne11fs hrrein 
reserved to be paid at the times and in thr man11l'r 
above 1nentioned agrees to execute and deliver to 
the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty 
deed conveying the title to the above described 
· :prentises free and clear of all encumbrances, ex-
cept as herein mentioned and except as may haYc 
accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the 
buyer, and to furnish at his expense an abstract or 
apolicy of title insurance at the option of the seller 
brought to date at the time of sale or at time of de· 
livery of deed at the option of the bnyer." 
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''T e agTee that the se Her binds himself to do two 
things on receiYing· the payments-to execute and deliver 
a deed conYeying· a good title to the buyer, and to furnish 
either an abstract of title or policy of title insurance 
brought to date at fi1ne of sale or at,thnc of delivery of· 
the deed at the option of the buyer. But he is only obli-
gated to do those t\vo things on receiving_ the payments 
agreed upon and not before. The buyer cannot demand 
that the seller do those things until full and complete 
payment has been made. The phrase ''at the option of 
the buyer'' clearly refers to the fact of whether the ab-
stract or policy of title insurance shall show as of time 
of sale or time when the deed is delivered, and under or-
dinary circumstances the buyer would exercise the option 
to have the abstract brought to date of delivery of the 
deed. 
The authorities cited by appellant to support his 
contention (page 26 of appellant's brief) are not applic-
able. In the case of Kneeland vs. Hetzel, 103 Okl. 3, 229 
Pac. 218, one of the cases cited by appellant, the question 
before the· court was whether the abstract furnished 
showed a marketable title. In the case at bar the court 
made an express finding that plaintiff's allegation that 
defendant did not have good title to the lands involved 
at the time the contract was entered into is untrue. (Find-
ing No. 29, R·~ 76). 
In the case of Naylor vs. Jolley, 111 Pac. (2nd) 14~, 
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100 Utah 130, this court held that "under land contract 
calling for deferred payments and delivery of deed at 
time of final payment, marketable title in vendor at time 
he is required to deliver deed is sufficient.'' The trial 
court held as a matter of law that under the express pro-
visions of the contract the· defendant was not required to 
tender an abstract or policy of title insurance until pay- -
ments due under the contract were made or at least ten-
dered, and held also that the failure of defendant's wife 
to execute the contract was no grounds for rescission. 
Clearly such holding is correct. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING 
THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
It is contended by appellant in its fourth cause of 
action that the contract is so uncertain and vague it can-
not be enforced. The trial court sustained a demurrer 
to this cause of action. 
We admit freely that the language of the contract 
pertaining to payments is awk,vard, quite usual where 
the average layman attempts to formulate a legal docu-
ment, and there is room for improvement by way of 
clearer_ expressions. However, when viewed in the light 
of the circumstances, the provisio~s in the contract con-
cerning payments are capable of- being construed har-
moniously and reasonably. 
It is true that the contract does not expressly obli-
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gate the plaintiff to apply for any ",.nter to irrigate the 
lands. Only the defendant, not the plaintiff, could be in-
jured because the contract did not expressly require the 
plaintiff to apply for "'"ater. It 'vill be remembered, how-
eYer, that either at the time the contract was executed 
or immediately thereafter the plaintiff did apply for 
\\'"ater and all of the neg-otiations and discussions leading-
up to the execution of the contract contemplated that he 
should do so. \\T e fail to see why the plaintiff should be 
concerned about the rights of the parties if he failed to 
apply for water, since he did actually apply for water to 
be taken from a number of wells. 
Vie,ved in the light of the circumstances and nego-
tiations leading up to the execution of the contract the 
meaning of the provisions concerning payment is reason-
ably clear. Each well application was for a definite 
amount and to irrigate a definite acreage. (Ex. 10 - and 
Trans. 158 to 161). Therefore when permission was 
given to drill a well under a certain application, it would 
permit the appropriation of water for a given and defi-
nite acreage. January 1st 'vas termed the end of each 
harvest season. Consequently the only reasonable con-
struction that can be given to the payment provision is 
this : When permission to drill under a certain applica-
tion should be granted by the state engineer, the acreage 
for which that particular 'veil was applied should be put 
into crops. On or before each .. January 1st thereafter 
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(which was termed the end of the harvest season) there 
would become due in cash the sum of $10.00 for each acre 
which the application called for to be irrigated thereun-
der, together with interest at 5% per annum on the pay-
ments so becoming due, until the full purchase price with 
interest has been paid. "rhe $2600 .. 00 down payment was 
to apply as a credit on the next -payment which became 
due and payable on January 1st, 1947. Of course, if no 
payment should become due under -the previous provi-
sions of the contract, the court 'vould construe such credit 
to apply on the first payment which would fall due. Pay-
ments of $10.00 per acre on the acreage tilled and cropped 
were undoubtedly to become due each year until the pur-
chase price was paid. No doubt the printed portion of the 
contract requiring monthly payments would be considered · 
as· surplusage and of no effect since the express written 
provisions would be controlling under all rules of con-
struction. 
The parties must have had a sufficient discussion 
concerning the terms of payment and plaintiff was sat-
isfied with the language because he testified (Tr. 11): 
''This contract was drawn up by McGarry and in reading 
it over and signing it in the office, from what I got of it, 
I had asked to have that ("until the full purchase price, 
together with interest") put in. It seemed to me the 
best thing to do. And Mr. 1\{cGarry signed that.'' 
The case of Cummings t~s. Nielsen, 129 Pac. 619, 4~ 
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Utah 157, is some,vhat analogous to the situation at bar. 
A contention was there made that the ag-reement was un-
certain because no time 'vas fixed within which the appel-
lants were required to exercise an option. Answering 
that arg·ument the court stated that ''it is elementary that 
in equity that is certain 'vhich can be made certain.'' The 
court held- also that definiteness under the circumstances 
could always be shown by extrinsic, parol or documentary 
evidence .. Also that it "ras the duty of the court to scruti-
nize carefully, the language used by the parties and in 
doing so ascertain therefrom, if possible, the intention of 
the parties and to enforce such intention. 
See also Johnson vs. Jones, 164 Pac. (2nd) 893, 109 
Utah 92. 
\\T e think the correct statement of law is set forth in 
Patterson et al., vs. Chambers' Power Co., 159 Pac. 568 
(Ore) wherein it is said: "It is a well recognized prin-
ciple of legal cons~ruction that a contract will not be held 
void for indebtedness when by considering it as a whole 
and taking into consideration the surrounding circum-
stances the true intent of the parties can be ascertained.'' 
I-Io,vever, it would seem that the question of whether 
the contract is uncertain is of no importance in this case 
since the plaintiff could never be confronted with how 
much acreage should be tilled and cropped and when 
and what payments would become due. Long before the 
plaintiff attempted to rescind the contract by serving 
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notice or otherwise, and .at a time when he claimed the 
contract was n·ot in default he filed applications to change 
the point of diversion of. the "\Vells _and place of use of 
land to be irrigated therefrom, thus showing conclusively 
that he did not intend to make any future -payments. The 
entire record shows that the plaintiff is attempting to 
avoid the agreement because of claimed misrepresenta-
tions as to availability of 'vater, and not because the con-
tract was indefinite. He tried to procure a modification 
of the agreement to reduce the acreage from 960 to 320 
but made no complaint as to the other terms of the agree-
ment. 
Besides, the plaintiff having breached the contract 
by failure to. till any acreage at all after having secured 
permission to drill several-wells on- the ground, and haY-
ing breached the contract in the other respects found by 
the court, should be in -no position to thereafter contend 
the contract is subject to rescission because of indefinite-
ness concerning provisions which need not be performed 
by him until after such breaches had occurred. 
CONTRACT NOT IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANCE 
Appellant takes the position that the contract is im-
possible of performance, and for such reason is invalid. 
If it is impossible of performance it is because there is 
no water available in the Beryl District for the irriga-
tion of land. It cannot be said there is 'vater available 
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in the district but not for the specific tract of land men-
tioned in the contract. The plaintiff's o'vn course of con-
duct and his actions belie this present contention. Plain-
tiff has not drilled any 'veils on the ground under pur-
chase although permission was granted by the state en-
gineer to drill three wells. He never applied for permis·-
sion to drill more, although permission could have been 
procured to do so. The state en~ineer testified that the 
wells in the Beryl district produced an average of from 
2 to 2.5 second feet of water (Tr. 139). Each applica-
tion was made on the basis of irrigating· about 40 acres 
per second foot. _ Therefore the plaintiff might reason-
ably anticipate he could irrigate 80 to 100 acres from each 
well or about 300 acres from the -three wells. He could 
have. secured permission to drill more wells by asking 
for such permission and showing ability to put them 
down. Plaintiff purchased other land in the Beryl dis-. 
trict and put down wells, and consequently he did not 
and does not believe the contract impossible of perform-
ance. It is reasonable to believe _that plaintiff would not 
buy other land and go to the expense of putting do,vn 
wells unless he had good reason to believe there was water 
available in the underground basin to justify such pur-
chase and expense. If water is not available on other 
and adjoining ground the plaintiff could and would have 
produced proof to that effect in the trial of this cause. 
Not having put any wells do,vn on the ground he pur-
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chased from defendant he cannot say that the contract is 
impossible of performance because 'vater is not available. 
It should be borne in mind that defendent offered to mod-
ify the contract by permitting plaintiff to purchase 320 
acres of land and retain sufficient water filing to irri-
gate such land but plaintiff refused to assign to defend-
ant the water filings for the irrigation of the premises 
not being purchased. This would indicate conclusively 
that plaintiff had faith in. the value and worth of these 
water filings but wanted to use them elsewhere. 
Finding No. 9 (R. 72) is to the effect that the Beryl 
underground basin 'vas greatly. over-appropriat~d at 
the time the. contract was made unless many prior ap- · 
propriators or applicants under then pending applica-
tions failed to use their appropriations or proposed ap-
propriations. We call attention to Finding No. 24 (R. 76) 
that many wells were drilled in the Beryl area and in the 
vicinity of the premises described in said contract in the 
year 1946 and also during the years 1947 and 1948, 
nearly all of which wells are producing water for irriga-
tion purposes. In other words, the evidence shows and 
the court found that in the three years following the mak-
ing of said contract many wells have been drilled and are 
producing water for irrigation of premises in the vicinity 
of the premises in question. Bearing in mind that the 
contract does not provide for a sale of any water and 
plaintiff does not contend that defendant guaranteed or 
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amount of water, and bearing in mind there is no proof 
that the district even three years after the making of 
said contract is over-pumped, it is difficult to see how 
the contract is impossible of performance. 
JUDG~IENT FINDS SUPPORT IN THE EVIDENCE. 
~ 
FIKDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In its ~Iemorandum of Decision the court concluded 
that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant was 
subject to rescission because of· misrepresentation as to 
availability of water for irrigation of said lands. The 
court concluded that the defendant, however, should not 
be required the refund the down_ payment received by him 
unless the water filings made in connection with the con-
tract be transferred and· assigned to the defendant; that 
if the rights acquired under the applications to appropri-
ate water sh<?uld be transferred and assigned to the de: 
fendant, the defendant should be required to repay the 
plaintiff the $2600.00 down payment, with legal interest 
and the fees and expenses paid by plaintiff to procure 
said applications; that if such transfers are not made 
then defendant should be released from any obligation 
to convey the real estate involved or to refund the down 
payment and the contract should be declared terminated. 
The court permitted plaintiff .fifteen days to give notice 
as to whether such water applications would be trans-
felTed. (R .. 68). 
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The trial court concluded that since the plaintiff 
took no steps to rescind the contract, after notice of the 
facts under which he claimed the right to rescind, and 
until long after the Governor's proclamation withdraw-
ing the Beryl underground district from further water 
appropriations, he should not in equity be permitted to 
retain all water filings for use elsewhere against the ex-
press terms of the contract and receive back the entire 
down payme_nt and be relieved from further obligation 
under the contract, thus leaving the defendant or defend-
ant's successor in interest without the right to appropri-
ate water. The court concluded that if the water filing·s 
did not accord to the plaintiff the water right to which 
he claimed he was entitled and as a consequence plaintiff 
should be relieved from his obligations under the con-
tract with a return of his down payment, then the water 
rights represent-ed. by such· filings, such as they are and 
for what they are worth, should be left to the defendant 
with the land in accordance with the express agreement 
of the parties. The court concluded that the plaintiff 
should either rescind the contract in its entirety or not 
at all. The court concluded the defendant, as 'vell as 
the plaintiff, was entitled to be placed in status quo; and 
also concluded that if the plaintiff was entitled· to relief 
after waiting many months to rescind the contract and 
after no further .water might be appropriated for the ir-
rigation of the land, then the defendant was entitled to 
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the filing-s 'vhich were made as a part of the deal between 
plaintiff and defendant. The court believed, and it could 
not believe other,Yise, that the applications for filings 
were made as a direct result of the purchase of the land 
and for the benefit of the land being purchased and with 
the definite understanding and agreement that the water 
represented by such filing·s would become a part of the 
land and remain with the land in case of default, and 
therefore the plaintiff should not oe entitled to rescind 
the contract and receive back his- down payment because 
of an insufficiency of water without leaving at least the 
insufficient supply with the land. 
RESPONDENT'S CROSS-ASSIGN~iENT OF ERROR 
The respondent and defendant assigns the following 
cross-assignment of errors committed by the trial court, 
to-wit: 
1. In making that portion of finding No. 9 which 
finds that representations made by defendant to plaintiff 
as to the availability of water for appropriation were 
untrue. ( R. 72). 
2. In making its conclusion of law No. 1 concluding 
that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was 
subject to rescission by plaintiff because of any misrep-
resentation by defendant as to availability of water for 
irrigation of lands. (R. 77). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
3. For failing to make an express conclusion that 
the failure of the plaintiff to rescind the said contract 
upon discovery of the alleged misrepresentation by de-
fendant as to the availability of water for irrigation of 
said lands, or upon receiving information sufficient to 
put him upon notice that statements concerning the avail-
ability of water were not true, and the failure of the 
plaintiff to rescind after learning that the state engineer 
questioned the availability of water, waived his right to 
rescind, and that the attempt to rescind on January 5th, 
1947, was not timely. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-ASSIGNl\lENT OF ERRORS 
Respondent will pres~nt his argument on the above 
cross-assignments in connection "\\ith his argument that 
the appellant was not entitled to rescind the contract be-
cause (Conclusion No. 2, R. · 77) he has not offered to res-
cind the contract in its entirety but demands .. a return of 
the down payment and. cancellation of the contract and 
asserts the right to retain all of the water filings and 
applications. We will discuss first the legal propositions 
involved and afterwards the factual situation. 
It is the position of respondent that the plaintiff "ras 
not entitled to rescind the contract and cannot prevail 
in this cause for the following reasons: 
1. One retaining benefits of a contract and continu-
ing to treat it as binding is deemed to haYe waived fraud 
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and elected to affirm the contract, and a party cannot 
rescind on grounds of fraud when, after knowledge, he· 
affirms it. 
2. A contract must be rescinded in ~ts entirety, and 
the complaining party cannot affirm in part and rescind 
in part. 
3. One claiming to have been defrauded must act 
promptly and any action in delaying the rescission to 
obtain an advantage is a ratification of the original 
agreement. 
4. One who has opportunity to know the facts con-
stituting alleged fraud, or who learns the facts, cannot 
remain inactive and thereafter rescind the contract. 
Propositions 1 and 2 as above stated, can, for the 
purpose of this discussion, be treated together. 
A statement of events and dates will no doubt be 
helpful. 
The contract was made on December 7th, 1945. 
( Pltf 's. Ex. A). The applications to appropriate water 
were made immediately or within a day or so thereafter, 
and were received in the office of the state engineer on 
December 13th, 1945. ( Tr. 90). On 1\{arch 2nd, 1946, the 
state engineer sent a letter to Vern Frailey concerning 
a11 of the applications and stated among other things "1 
feel certain that your applications will not ·receive favo:._-
able consideration for at least a year." (Pltf's. Ex. B. Tr. 
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67). On or about March 29th, 1946, a meeting 'vas held 
- at the Wells School House at Beryl, in which the farm-
ers expressed themselves as being willing to have the 
present outstanding applications approved and as believ-
ing sufficient water to be· available without impairing 
the underground water basin up to that point. (Tr. 104-5). 
On April lOth, 1946, the Governor of Utah by proclama-
tion suspended the right of the public to appropriate sur-
plus or unappropriated waters in the B-eryl area. (Deft's. 
Ex. 11; Tr. 134). On April 21st, 1946, Frailey sent a let-
ter to the state engineer saying, ''I believe it would be 
most advantageous to us if we be permitted to drill wells 
Nos.17118 and 17121." (Deft's. Ex. 2; .Tr. ql). On April 
25th, 1946, the state engineer sent Frailey a letter saying, 
''We can no"\v act upon the applications filed individu-
ally and it is believed that there is underground water 
that may be appropriated." (Deft's. Ex. 3; Tr. 52-55). 
This letter also states that it 'vas the unanimous opinion 
of all water users present in the meeting that more wells 
could be drilled without seriously interfering with exist-
ing rights and again saying Frailey could drill two 'vells. 
On May 23rd, 1946, :B.,railey sent a letter to the state en-
gineer saying he wanted to change the location of the 
wells and asking if McGarry could prohibit him from so 
doing. (Deft's. Ex. 4; Tr. 56-75). On l\Iay 31st, 1946, the 
state engineer sent a letter to Frailey saying there ·was 
no reason why such a change application could not he 
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filed if Frailey had not entered into a contract that would 
prohibit it, and advising· there wa~ nothing to prevent a 
change application before Frailey was in default under 
his contract. (Deft's. Ex. 5; Tr. 58-59). On June 13th, 
1946, Mr. Isom, Frailey's attorney, advised the state 
engineer by letter that ''Frailey has decided to let the 
land go back and forfeit the contract but he is not yet in 
default and wants to move the wells off· first.'' (Deft's. 
Ex. 6; Tr. 59 to 61). On June 14th,'1946~ the change ap-
plications were fi~ed. (Tr. 94). On August 9th, 1946, 
Thompson filed change applications. (Tr. 95). On Jan-
uary 15th, 1947, notice of rescission was given by plain-
tiff to defendant, (Deft's. Ex. 1). All change applica-
tions were duly protested by McGarry. 
From the outline of events and dates- it is yery 
clear that the plaintiff brought the action for rescission 
of the contract, not because of any claimed fraud or mis-
representation or because he thought no water would be 
available to irrigate the ground, but because he did not 
want to proceed with the purchase of the entire tract and 
could not hope to avoid the provision of the contract 
which provides the seller would become the assignee of 
\Vater applications in case of a default, unless the con-
tract could be rescinded and held to be of no force and 
effect. The matter of water applications was then of 
paramount importance because Frailey could not file on 
additional water after the governor's proclamation, and 
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by the same token the defendant, or any subsequent pur-
chaser of the land, could not file upon or procure other 
or additional water. It is also clear that after the state 
engineer gave the hint to Frailey that he could perhaps 
move the location of the wells and place of use, before 
his contract was in default, and after Attorney Isom gave 
him similar advice, Frailey and Thompson then filed 
their applications to get their wells moved before serving 
nny notice of rescission. There would have been no law-
suit and no attempt to rescind the contract had there 
been no proclamation suspending the right to make more 
filings. That is shGwn conclusively by Attorney Isom's 
letter to the state engineer on June 13th, 1946, stating· 
''Frailey has decided to let the land go back and forfeit 
the contract which is not yet in default and wants to 
move the wells off first.'' At that time he had in mind to 
default and rescission was an afterthought. When de-
fendant protested the change applications on the ground 
that the contract prohibited such a removal, then and 
then only the idea of rescis~ding the contract occurred 
to him or his advisers. All that Frailey wanted in the 
first instance, after tire contract 'vas signed, was to re-
duce the acreage under his contract from 960 acres to 
320 acres, and to keep all of the water filings. He made 
that very proposition to McGarry but at that time made 
no claim to a right o-f rescissio·n or a return of his down 
payment. 
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The follo,ving· provision in the contract is clear, defi-
nite and certain, nor is it contended either by Frailey or 
Thompson that they were misled into so agreeing, or 
that they did not kno'v the clear purport of the language 
and its effect, to-"'"it: 
It is agTeed that in the event the buyer or any 
assig·nee shall make application to appropriate 
water or shall procure a certificate of appropriation 
to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate 
to appropriate water from wells located upon the 
said premises and said buyer or a·ssignee or as-
signees shall thereafter default in this contract, the 
seller shall immediately become the assignee of any 
such application or appropriation and the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized 
to recognize said seller as the assignee of any such 
application and in the event a certificate of approp-
riation has issued to the said buyer, the water rights 
thereunder shall be considered as appurtenant to 
the said premises and in the event of default, the 
title thereto shall immediately pass to the seller. 
The applications represented something of value to 
the defendant in the event of a failure of the plaintiff to 
proceed under the contract. They represented something 
of value to the plaintiff and the plaintiff would not res-
cind the contract until after he and Thompson had pro-
cured permission to drill three wells and filed change ap-
plications on such wells and all of the ·other wells repre-
sented by their filings or applications, so that the land 
would be deprived of the benefit of water filings and 
\\'ater to be procured thereunder and so that the provi .. 
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dered nugatory. 
It will be recalled that the plaintiff was advised by 
the state engineer as early as March 2nd, 1946, that there 
was a grave question concerning the right to secure fav-
orable consideration to drill wells for at least one year. 
Thereafter plaintiff asked permission to drill two wells 
and Thompson asked permission to drill one well and both 
secured such permissiqn. Plaintiff is now asking that the 
contract be rescinded and held of no binding force and 
effect, which would permit him not only to recover back 
the down payment, but retain the . benefits represented 
by the water applications and well rights, turning back 
the land after he had remained · in possession for one 
year during which time the right to secure water for said 
Jand had been lost through the governor's proclamation 
suspending further applications. 
In the offer. of rescission plaintiff neither tendered 
back the possession of the premises nor offered to return 
the water applications, but on the contrary he has re-
tained and used and intends to retain and use all of the 
benefits to be had from these applications. 
Plaintiff has therefore elected to affirm the contract 
as to his right to the filings and applications, and has 
taken and used the water, (as has Thompson also), from 
two of the wells which have been drilled. He cannot be 
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permitted to affirm the contract in part and rescind as 
to part. 
''It is "'"ell settled that, if the complaining 
party has allowed a change to take place so as to 
modify the situation with reference to the property 
inYolved, or, if he retains benefits under the orig-
inal or ne"'" contract, then rescission will not be de-
clared. In Appleman, et al., vs. Pepis, 117 Okl. 
199, 246 Pac. 225, the rule is stated as follows: 
'\\.,..here a party to a contract pursues a course of 
action that expresses an intention to be bound by 
the contract and expresses an intention to enjoy the 
benefits of the contract, he cannot then escape the 
burdens of the contract.' The_rule is stated by the 
Sup.reme Court of Utah in the case of LeVine vs. 
Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. · 2 (Ann. Cas. 
19120 407), as follows : 'A party misled must, as 
soon as he learns the truth and discovers the falsity 
of statements relied on, disaffirm the contract with 
all reasonable diligence, and he cannot derive all 
possible benefit from the transaction and then 
claim relief from his own obligation by a rescission 
or refusal to execute.' To the same effect are the 
follo"ring authorities: Fa-rmers' State Bank · vs. 
n·arrington, 225 Pac. 705; Croak vs. Trentman, 150 
Pac. 1088." Evans rs. Turney, 61 Pac. 2nd, 237. 
The above case of Evans YS. Turney is also authoritl. 
for the proposition that before there may· be a rescission 
there must be a failure of the entire consideration of the 
contract. 
In the case at bar plaintiff does not contend that he 
did not receive the right to drill some wells, nor does he 
contend that for the irrigation seasons of 1946, 1947 and 
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1948 the wells s~ drilled did not produce ample water or 
that water was not available from the wells. Neither does 
plaintiff contend that he and Thompson could not have 
secured permission to drill wells under their other appli-
cations had they· so applied. Thompso·n and Frailey 
both admit they never requested permission beyond the 
three wells for which they obtained the right to drill, and 
~fr. Ward testified they could have go~ten permission to 
drill all of the wells had they so applied and shown to the 
state engineer that they had the means of putting down 
the wells and would use the wells in the actual irrigation 
of land. (Tr. 132-133). 
The case of LeVine, et al vs. Whitehouse, et al, 37 
Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2, is very illustrative of the .proposi-
tion that a person claiming to ·have been defrauded 'vill 
lose his right to rescind if he takes· any benefit under the 
contract or doe·s any other act implying intent to abide 
by or affirm it, afte~.: he becomes aware of the claimed 
Jro.ud. Also the LeVine case holds :. 
A party misled must, as soon as he learns the 
• truth and discovers the falsity of statements relied 
on, disaffirm the contract with all reasonable dili· 
gence, and he cannot derive all possible benefit from 
the transaction and then claim relief from his o'vn 
obligation by a rescission or refusal to execute. 
A party to a contract tainted with, and who is 
injured by fraud may either affirm the contract and 
sue for damages or disaffirm and sue for cancella-
tion, but, if he rescinds, he must rescind the con-
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firm "~holly and not in part. Cattell vs. Denver 
State Bank, ~~5 Pac. 271 (Colo). 
We call the court's attention to the very recent case 
of Morse vs. Kogle, cited at 178 Pac. (2nd) 275 (Kan), 
which tersely reviewing the authorities concerning the 
necessity of rescinding promptly upon discovery of the 
alleged fraud, holds that treating a contract as binding 
after having knowledge of the alleged fraud is an affirma-
tion and is then not subject to rescission. 
Where a party, with knowledge of facts en-
titling him to rescission of a contract, afterward, 
without fraud or duress, ratifies the same, he has 
no claim to the relief of cancellation. An express 
ratification is not required in order thus to defeat 
his remedy; any acts of recognition of the contract 
as subsisting or any conduct inconsistent with an· 
intention of avoiding it, have the effe·ct of an elec-
tion to affirm. Indeed it has been declared that 
since the remedy of rescission is not held in high 
esteem by the courts, even slight circumstances 
showing a purpose or intent to 'vaive it will pre-
clude the allowance of such relief. * * * Sec. 38 
Cancellation of Instruments, 12 C. J. S. page 996. 
As a general rule the receipt of benefits under 
the contract, or acts of dominion or o'vnershi p exer-
cised over the property received under the contract 
after knowledge of the ground of rescission amount 
to a ratification. This is especially true if plain-
tiff, with knowledge of his right to rescind, has so 
dealt with the property as to make. restoration 
thereof impossible. * * * He cannot occupy the 
inconsistent po~ition of going on \Vith the contract 
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and at the same time claiming the right to rescind 
it, nor can he vacillate or delay. Sec. 38 (b) Can-
cellation of Instruments, 12 C. J. 8. page 998-cit-
ing numerous cases. 
The authorities on the foregoing propositions are so 
numerous and universal, they could be multiplied almost-
without end. 
Even though it could conceivably be held that apply-
ing for and receiving permission to- drill wells long be-
fore any change _applications were made, retaining the 
benefits of such wells for use on other ground, and as 
Frailey testified, making demand for an abstract of title 
in the fall of 1946, and applying for change applic~tions: 
was not an affirmation of the contract, most certainly the 
poi'ition taken by Frailey on J urie 13th, 1946, ·was defi-
nite. On that. date_ 1\Ir. Isom sent a letter to the state 
- engine·er in which it was stated: '-,,Frailey has decided to 
let thn land go 'ba'ck 'and-forfeit the contract, but he is ~ot 
yet in default and- wants to- move the wells off first. He 
has '!a sing on the ground and can get a driller.'' That 
definitely anchored his position and shows conclusively 
that he had no intention of cl~iming a right of rescission, 
but on the contrary ~as going to -let his contract go into 
default and forfeit his rights thereunder, but would hold 
the contract in standing until he could move the wells off 
first. 
Addressing our attention now to propositions 3 and 
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4, we submit the following authorities which are over-
""helming and universally followed by the courts of all 
jurisdictions : 
If a party has been defrauded by another, he 
must act promptly and at once restore or offer to 
return the property '\\rhich he has received. After 
discovery of a fraud, if the party affected thereby 
does anything in procuring an extension of a per-
formance of the terms of the agreement out of which 
some unjust advantag·e is undertaken to be obtained, 
his action in such respect constitutes a ratification 
of the original contract. Hewitt vs. Andreu;s, 140 
Pac. 437 (Ore). 
The general rule that the purchaser 'vaives his 
right to rescind by failure to exercise it promptly on 
discovery of the grounds applies where the ground 
relied on is mistake, duress, failure to procure the 
conveyance within the limited time, or deficiency 
in quantity. ]fcKellar Real Estate & Investment 
Co. vs. Paxton, 218 Pac. 128, at page 132, 62 Utah 97. 
In this connection it must b~ remembered that the 
plaintiff went into possession of the premises described 
in the contract, (Tr. 163), did some work thereon, and at 
no time offered to· return possession of the premises to 
the defendant. As a matter of. fact, even the notice of 
recsission served about January 15th, 1947, did not offer 
to return the posseHsion of the premises to defendant. 
Had the defendant entered into the possession of the 
premises, at least at any time up to the service of the 
notice of rescission over a year after the contract "\\'as 
made, he would have been guilty of an unlawful and fore-
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ible entry and detainer. See Paxton vs. Dearden, 45 Pac. 
(2nd) 903, 86 Utah 408. 
Concerning the matter of posses-sion of the premises, 
at the trial- the plaintiff attempted to discount the legaJ 
effect of having retained possession for over a year after 
entering into the contract J>y contending that he and 
Thompson were not in physical possession and the ground 
'vas open where defendant could have gone on it and 
taken the possession. It is not explained just how plain-· 
tiff could have expected defendant to take possession until 
plaintiff had served a notice of rescission and thus ad-· 
vised defendant that the ·contract· was being abandoned . 
. 'l,he letter of plaintiff's counsel to the state engineer in 
.June of 1946 stated that the plaintiff was not in default, 
'vhich is equivalent to claiming he was entitled to possCls-
'3i on of the premises under the contract. Before serving 
notice of rescission, the entire course ·of conduct indicated 
ihat he 'vas proceeding under the contract. 
This court ("\V ash.) has been .more than liberal, 
even generous, in allowing a rescission of fraudu-
lently induced contracts for the purchase of land, 
but our attention is called to no cases holding that 
a vendee can, after ample time to ascertain the 
facts, and after undertaking to turn the land into 
a fair bargain on his own account, and after a lapse 
of several months rescind his contract. Pearson t'S. 
Gullans, 142 Pac. 456. 
A party misled must, as soon as he learns the 
truth and discovers the falsity of statements relied 
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on, disaffirm the contract 'vith all reasonable dili-
gence. Le V~ine vs. Whitehouse, 109 Pac. 2, 37 Utah 
260. 
The justify the rescission, the party seeking to 
avail himself of that ren1edy must move promptly 
and with all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the 
contract upon discovery of the fraud. He must re-
store both parties to their original position. He is 
not allowed to go on deriving all possible benefit 
from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved 
from his own obligations by seeking its rescission. 
Taylor vs. Moore, 51 Pac. (2nd) 222, at page 227, 87 
Utah 493. 
The Taylor case above cited also holds: The means of 
Knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. A party who has 
lpportunity of knowing the facts constituting the alleged 
,·raud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want 
•f knowlf~dge that arose by reason of his own ]atchcs 
; 1 nd negligence. 
Notice of acts and circumstances putting a man 
of ordinary intelligence and prudenc-e upon inquiry 
is equivalent to knowledge of fraud necessary to an 
acquiescence in the fraut. Whitney vs. Bissell, 146 
Pac. 141. 
The case of Zuniga, et al.; vs. Leone, et al., 297 Pac. 
tOlO, 77 Utah 494, sets forth the established law on this 
~ubject wherein it is h~ld the right to rescind a contract 
is gone after ratifying it. This court upheld the lower 
~ourt in refusing to permit a rescission, even though it 
tppeared there had been a misrepresentation concerniu~ 
\Ito value of a stock of merchandise. This -court an-
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nounced the universal rule as follows: 
A purchaser has merely an election to rescind 
for fraud or misrepresentation of the vendor, the 
·contract being voidable and not void, and his rig·ht 
to rescin-d is gone after he has once ratified or af-
firmed the contract, either expressly or impliedly, 
as to recognizing or treating it as binding or accept-
ing benefits under it 'vith full knowledge of the 
fraud or misrepresentation and of his legal rights. 
In the Zuniga case above cited the plaintiff vv·ith 
kn0wledge of the facts about which they complained, re-
tained the occupation and use of the real property for 
over a year, sold the merchandise and entered into an 
.agreement modifying the original contract. It "Tas held 
this amounted to a recognition and treatment of the eon-
tract as va~id which precluded a rescission. In the casH 
at bar, the plaintiff did not attempt any rescission for 
over a year, and while he did not enter into an agreement 
for 9. modification of the original contract, he did nep;o 
tiate for such modification and offered to· proceed with 
the purchase of a part of the land. 
We do not know whether the plaintiff is urging that 
there is not sufficient "rater available to irrigate the land 
at this time or whether there may not be sufficient 'vater 
available ·in the years to come; but in either event, the 
information upon whic~ plaintiff now relies was avail-
able to him at all times. Particularly after receiving the 
state engineer's letter of :1\Iarch 2nd, 1946, plaintiff could 
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have secured and had the benefit of all such information. 
In his letter to Frailey dated March 2nd, 1946, the state 
.. 
engineer said: "It is true that there appear to be larg6 
quantities of water that are stored in the g_round in this 
valley that would perhaps satisfy the proposed diver .. 
sions for a year or two, but with the state enginer 's of: 
fice this is a serjous problem * * * ' ' Frailey discussed 
with the state engineer on the occasion of his. visit on 
March 20th or thereabouts the number of outstanding ap-
plications, (Tr. 14-77) and knew or could have, learned. 
from the records while there what he might expect as to 
the availability of water. The state engineer. could have 
told him as much then as no_w, and .Frailey knew, or could 
have learned from the state engineer's office, as. much 
about the availability or lack of. availability of water to 
' 
irrigate the tract of land in question on March 20th, 1946, 
as he knows now or learned at the trial. Any simple in-
quiry from and discussion with the state engineer would 
develop all of the information testified to by Mr. Ward. 
In fact, in the light of the state ~ngineer 's letter of March 
2nd, 1946, which resulted in Frailey and Thompson going 
to see him, it seems inconceivable that Frailey did not 
discuss the question of availability of water and was ad-
vised of the matters upon which he now relies for a right 
of rescission. 
If there was no water a vail able to irrigate the tract 
in 1945 when the contract was made, and in 1946, the fol-
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lowjng irrigation season, then Frailey either knew of such 
facts as early as March of 1946, or 'vas on notice that ·he 
could have ascertained the facts. What did he do about 
the matter~ He failed to attempt to rescind for about 
a year. Meanwhile he tried to have the contract modified 
by taking and keeping 320 acres of land with all of the 
water applications. . He applied for and received permis-
sion to drill three wells. During the summer or fall of 
1946 he demanded, so he says, that McGarry furnish him 
with an abstract of title covering all of the lands, so he 
could determine if the title ·was good. He was not par-
ticularly concerned about the water situation when he 
·drilled a well at considerable expense and when Thompson 
also drilled a well. He applied for the right to change 
the point of diversion and place of use of all of the water 
applications. And then about a year later he claimed the 
right to rescind on the theory that water is not available. 
That the claim for rescission was not made timely is 
amply borne out by his o'vn direct testimony and we neerl 
not rely only on his acts. · In January, 1946, about a month 
after entering into the contract he beg·an to hear rumors 
and stories about not having his applications allowed; 
that· he was worried because the applications were not 
being advertised and he came to Utah from California 
and discussed with various people the matter of his appli-
cations not being approved and discussed it 'vith Mc-
Garry; that McGarry said it would be best to go to Salt 
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Lake to ~ind out about the matter; that he did so and 
talked 'vith .1\'Ir. ''! ard; that Mr. Ward clarified his mind 
about the matter and he learned that the applications 
\vere not going to be approved ( Tr. 13-14); that after talk-
ing with the state engineer it took a good deal of thought 
on his part to decide what to do and he had a talk ·with 
McGarry and could not arrive at anything definite where 
he could feel secure in going ahead 'vith the development 
of the. ground. He then talked with ~{r. Isom, an attor-
ney at Cedar. (Tr. 16). He the~ told McGarry he was 
willing to go ahead. with about 320. acres and narrow the 
contract down to something he ~ould handle ; he wanted 
to farm what land he could get water for but could not go 
ahead on the entir~ tract of land (Tr. 16). Shortly after 
that h~ found he could not negotiate with McGarry and 
he thought it was better to go into litigation; that he made 
a trip to Salt Lake and located a section of state land on 
advice from the engineer, and.then attempted to move all 
of the well applications; that he bought 640 acres from 
the state, and that he put down a well on the land l,>eing 
purchased from the state (Tr. 16-17). 
In answer to a question concerning whether he could 
get permission to drill more than two wells, Frailey 
stated: 
A. I didn't want to get in any more trouble than 
I had. I didn't ".,.ant to go ahead and not have 
any understanding how much ground there was. 
I offered to buy as much ground as I had water . 
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to put on it, what I could obtain for· it, buy the 
ground. If at a later time I 'vas allowed more 
water I would purchase more ground, either 
way. vVe couldn't come to any terms on it. 
* * * (Tr. 29) . 
. A. That is when I came to McGarry and offered 
to purchase 320 acres, insofar as I was allowed 
tentative permission to drill, I wanted to segre-
gate 320 acres which T could pay for and obtain 
a deed for. (Tr. 30). 
· That in March, 1946, when he secured permission 
from the state engineer to drill two wells he then intended 
to go through with the McGarry contract, and that was 
the time when he thought it best to try to buy only the 
320 acres; that when McGarry said he didn't want to 
change the contract Frailey then changed his mind; that 
it tvas after permission was given to put down the wells 
that he concluded he was nof going to proceed with the 
McGarry contract. ( Tr. 33-34). That McGarry offered 
to cancel the contract and return the money if Frailey 
would assign the water applications but that Frailey 
wanted to cancel the contract and keep all "rater appli-
cations; that he did not want to assign the water applica-
tions because after visiting the state engineer he was ad-
vised ·by that office the water was not appurtenant to 
the land. ( Tr. 3'5). 
Frailey concluded he "ras not going' through with the 
McGarry contract as early as April or May, 1946, but 
failed to serve notice of rescission for some eight month~ 
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thereafter. Application to relocate the wells for which 
permission to drill ",.as granted as in June. Frailey tes-
tified as follows : 
~-
Q. Now, 'vhen you concluded you was not going 
through with this contract, you filed applica-
tions with the State Engineer, did you not, to 
change the point of diversion and place of use 
of some of these· applications? 
.A.. That· is right. 
(Tr. 36). 
Q. From April, until~ I think, January 12th (fol-
lo"ring) you made no demand upon Mr. Mc-
Garry for either a return of the money or ad-
vising him that you 'vas going to rescind the 
contract. 
A. Nothing official. It took a good deal of thought 
to decide to completely seve~r the deal. 
Q. In other words, you was thinking about whether 
you would or would not rescind the contract 
from April, 1946,-until about the middle of Jan-
uary, 1947~ 
A. Sometimes it takes a good deal of time to locate 
an attorney you feel you can go ahead with. I 
had tried in Cedar City. I didn't know how 
long I could go alone and the attorney not go-
ing here to take the case. I was cogitating a 
good deal trying to determine whether to go 
through with it or have a lawsuit. 
Q. That is your explanation of the delay~ 
A. Yes, sir. I was extremely busy. 
* * * * * 
Q. Weren't you advised by your counsel in the 
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summer of 1946 that your contract was not yet 
in default and that you had better move this 
water before it was in default~ 
A. I believe I was. 
Q. Surely. Isn't it a fact that- _you deliberately 
held back from attempting to rescind this con-
tract until you had the advantage of moving 
this water while your contract was still alive 
and in force~ 
A. Well, the transactions all went on at that 
time. I don't kno'v \Vhether I deliberately held 
back. I 'vas deliberating, negotiating, studying 
it. There was quite a bit of business going on 
at that time. 
* * * * * 
Q. During the year (1946) no \veils \vere drilled 
on this 1\{cGarry gr~und ~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Since about April of 1946 you have had no in-
tention of drilling any wells on that ground. 
A. I don't recall the exact date, as I say, that I 
had any intention of drilling wells, it was after 
my meeting with McGarry, I went to Mr. Me· 
Garry with Mr. Isom and tried to negotiate on 
some smaller tract of ground, some time after 
that, why I decided there was no soap. 
Q. When you was advised that you would be al-
lowed three wells and you had no assurance any 
others would be allowed, \vhy didn't you rescind 
the ·contract then and there~ 
.LL\.. Well, it took a good deal of thought to decide, 
that is why I tried to negotiate for a smaller 
piece of ground. 
(Tr. 39). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
We call partieular attention to the testimony of 
Frailey on pages 41 to 50 of the transcript or bill of ex-
ceptions, from which it becomes apparent that Frailey 
wanted his cake and wanted to eat it too-that he wanted 
to go through with the deal when he demanded an ab-
stract as late as September; that he decided not to go 
through with the deal when he filed the change applica-
tions in June; that he wanted to modify the contract so 
he could keep all the water and buy 320 acres of ground, 
but keep an option on the balance; that when he filed the 
change applications he might decide to move the wells 
back to the :NicGarry ground, etc. etc. 
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUS-
TAIN A FINDING .OF MISREPRESENTATION 
Up to at least July of 1945, and perhaps for several 
months thereafter, water was appropriated merely by 
having prepared and by filing with the state engineer a 
formal application therefor and permission to drill a well 
was given quickly thereafter. (Tr. 123). 
The extent of the representations as to availability 
of water is as shown by Frailey's testimony. McGarry 
said there was an underground lake and an abundance of 
water flowing underground and that there had never 
been any trouble in obtaining plenty of water for irriga-
tion. (Tr. 8). That McGarry told him of the amount of 
water available in the valley, that there had been no 
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draw down in thirty years; that they had a large lake un. 
derlying the valley and an underground stream feeding 
it from the hills. (Tr. 19). That McGarry told him he 
might drill a well and produce water from it but McGarry 
did not say and he did not inquire as to the procedure 
thereafter; that- if permission was granted to drill a 
well, that would give him all McGarry promised or told 
him about. (Tr. 27). It is quite obvious that Frailey was 
not concerned particularly about any failure of water 
supply because after having received permission to drill 
t'\10 W(llls Frailey wanted to ·purchase 320 acres of the 
tract in question and obtain a deed therefor, and ,'if more 
-wells were allowed, I could go ahead and get more land,'' 
and at that time Frailey had no intention of applying for 
more wells or putting more down. (Tr. 43-44). McGarry 
testified that when the contract was signed it was ru-
mored there was a little concern in the state enginer's 
_office that because of applications coming in at quite a 
heavy rate they might be slow in allowing the applica-
tions and for that reason the clause in the contract ''on 
any and all lands where water well permits are granted 
and allowing water for any given acreage, said acreage 
is to be tilled and cropped'' was inserted. ( Tr. 156). Mc-
Garry denied that he represented to Frailey that all of 
the applications would be allowed by the state engineer 
or that he would be given permission to drill a well for 
each of the applications in sixty days after the date of 
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filing them. (Tr. 157). 
The express provisions in the contract concerning 
payments thereunder only on lands for which well per-
mits have been granted not only lends credence to the de-
fendant's testimony, but there would be absolutely no 
purpose in such a provision if it was agreed and intended 
that all of the W'ell permits would be allowed within sixty 
days. 
In any event Frailey received permission to drill all 
the wells he intended to put down during 1946. He has 
never since requested permission to drill more wells and 
Mr. Ward testified that such permission could be secured 
upon proper_showing of ability to put them down and put 
the water to a beneficial use. In fact the state engineer 
''was anxious'' to have all applicants in the Beryl dis-
trict get their wells down so he might, have future data 
\ 
as to the availability of water. (Tr. 132). 
There is not onB vvord of testimony in the entire rec-
ord to the effect that McGarry knew or that it was im-
possible to secure "\Vater rights to irrigate the lands. Mr. 
Ward testified that until about July 10, 1945, and per-
haps as late as September 10, 1945, applications were ap-
proved as a matter of course "\vithin a fe"\v days after 
being received in his office; that sometime .thereafter the 
state engineer's office adopted the policy of withholding 
permission to drill 'vells, but he did not know and had no 
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record of when that policy was adopted; that no public 
announcement was made of such policy. (Tr. 104 and 
124). The record does not disclose whether the change 
of poliey 'vas before or after the Frailey contract was 
executed. 
The only serious charge of misrepresentation in the 
amended complaint which can possibly stand as a basis 
for an alleged fraud is the all~gation that defendant rep-
resented there was ample water available and that he 
knew it was impossible to secure a sufficient water right 
to irrigate the lands described in the complaint. It is, 
therefore, important to discuss this charge at some length. 
We submit there is no sufficient proof as to lack of ample 
water available to irrigate the land, and ni sufficient 
proof that the defendant knew it was impossible to secure 
a sufficient water right. 
In his letter of April 25, 1946, after the governor's 
proclamation suspending further applications, the state 
engineer stated ''it is believed that there is underground 
water that may be appropriated." (Tr. 54). The letter 
also gave permission to drill two wells and state~ it was 
the unanimous opinion of all water users present at the 
meeting on .March 20th that more wells could be drilled 
without seriously interfering with existing rights. 
In com.menti:rig on the following testimony we do 
not set forth the specific transcript pag·e reference to each 
bit of testimony since it is not practicable to do so, but 
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these facts are all sho,vn by ~lr. '':r ard in his testimony 
\vhich is not very lengthy. 
Frailey and Thompson never applied for permission 
to drill more than three wells. If they had, such permis-
sion would have been g·ranted, providing they were in a 
position to put down the wells and put the water to a 
beneficial use. None of the applications have ever been 
rejected. They we!"e all advertised as required by law 
and no protests were filed. About 40 wells were put down 
in 1946, about 40 more in 1947, and still more in 1948. 
There is no evidence that such 'veils did not produce water 
or that water was not available therefrom. Many appli-
cations were filed after the Frailey and Thompson appli-
cations were filed. As the water table is lowered in the 
Beryl district Mr. 'Vard would expect a lesser drop 
thereafter because the sage and other vegetation and 
wild plant life would not then use up and take from .the 
ground a considerable amount of water. Neither Ward 
nor Frailey nor anyone else has claimed that the numer-
ous wells which were put down in 1946, 194 7 and 1948 
were dry holes or produced but a minor quantity of 
\Vater. No one, includin-g ~Ir. Ward, claims that wells 
have been abandoned because there is no water available, 
or even that water· rig·hts have been affected through an 
overpumping of the valley. No wells have been ordered 
shut down or have voluntarily ceased operations through 
lack of water. The 'vater table between the years 1936 
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to and including 1946, a period of eleven years, has gone 
down less than three feet-2.80 feet to be exact. Some 
of the years there was a lowering of the water table and 
some of the years it was raised. Mr. Ward did not claim, 
nor did anyone else, that such a lowering of the water 
table constituted a serious depletion of the water s~pply, 
or left any of the lands for which water was applied with-
. out an adequate or available supply. On the contrary, 
all of the figures, excepting perhaps the year 1946, were 
available and known to the state engineer when he held 
the meeting "\\7ith the water u~ers at the "'\Veils school, and 
when the water users unanimously expressed the belief 
that more wells could be drilled without interfering with 
existing rights. Moreover, these figures were available 
when the state engineer granted permission to drill wells 
in 1946, 194 7 and 1948, and when he advised Frailey that 
he believed there was underground water that might be 
appropriated. True it is that Mr. Ward gave it as his 
opinion there was not sufficient water ''to take care of 
all of the filings made prior to December, 1945~ '' But he 
also testified that only a small number_ of wells under 
such applications had been put down or were being 
pumped, and that the wells which were being pumped 
when the Frailey contract was signed had ''hardly any 
effect on the water table-that the effect was negligible." 
lV£~. Ward did not profess to know how many of the prior 
applications will ever be used, and if so whether in sev-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
eral years from no'v or twenty years from now. It is 
significant that the state engineer is anxious for all ap· 
plicants, including Frailey and Thompson, to get their 
'veil~ down, so the effect on the water table may be de-
termined. If the state engineer is at all sure there is no 
w'ater available for these additional wells, or that no 
·,vater was available in 1946, it was clearly his duty to 
. . 
reject all such applications. It is also to be noted that 
the availability of water, so far as future years are con-
cerned, is greatly enhanced, and the Frailey and Thomp-
son applications made more secure by the subsequent 
proclamation of the governor suspending further appli-
cations until this question can be definitely answered at 
some time in the future . 
• It is pertinent to ask-was water available to irri-
gate the land in December of 1945 when the Frailey con-
tract was written? The answer must be in the affirma-
tive, since in the neighborhood of one hundred wells were 
subsequently put down-about forty in l946, about forty 
in 1947 and a number in 1948. The following question 
and answer sums the entire situation up in a nutshell. 
Q. (Asked of n1r. Ward). When these Frailey and 
Thompson applications were made in Decem ... 
ber, 1945, and had you granted permission to 
drill those seven wells, and had they (Frailey 
and Thompson) drilled those seven wells in the 
spring of 1946, is it your judgment there was 
water then and there available to irrigate the 
acreage mentioned in those applications. 
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A. If you exclude all the wells that weren't drilled 
covered by applications filed prior to Decem-
ber 13th, I "rould say yet. If you don't I would 
say no._ 
(,.fr. 137). 
This case was tried in the fall of 1948. About 100 
wells were drilled subsequent to the execution of the con-
tract in 1946, 194 7 and 1948, and the average well pro-
duces 2 to 2.5 second feet of water. Yet three years after 
the drilling of about forty of these wells;two years after 
the drilling of about eighty of these wells, and after the 
irrigation season of the third year, neither the state engi-
neer's office nor the plaintiff can make any claim that 
the wells were going dry or had depreciated in wat~r 
supply or that the general availability of water was ques-
tioned. 
It is not claimed that 1\fcGarry guaranteed or that 
it was intended or expected he would gu~rantee water 
would remain available for a definite number or for all 
future years. He did not guarantee nor was it intended 
or expected he would guarantee that the state engineer 
would not. thereafter permit many other and later appli-
cants to put down wells and perhaps deplete the water 
supply. The contract does not provide nor was it in-
tended that McGarry would or could in future years con-
trol the availability of water. Is there any claim that 
McGarry assured plaintiff the water supply would hold 
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up in the future years, irrespective of contingencies, 
drouth, or what not 1 The fact remains that in 1946 and 
up to the present time there IS available water. The fact 
remains that the state engineer does not now claim there 
is no water available for the Thompson and Frailey appli-
cations, nor does the state engineer make any pretense 
that he knows when water will not be available. The 
most that can be said about the engineer '-s concern over 
the availability of water. is that ~if everyone with an ap-
plication actually puts down a well and pumps water 
consistently therefrom, and if all previous well rights are 
in use, there will not be a sufficient supply. Apparently 
there were 371 wells in existence when a survey was 
made between 19B9 and 1940, and covering wells drilled 
· before 1935. Only 23 of that number 'vere being us·ed for 
irrigation purposes in March, 1946, when the state engi-
neer met with the farmers. The remaining wells were 
drill~d and dug primarily to satisfy homestead require-
ments. 11any of the 284 remaining wells had only irri-
gated a very small acreage of ground and the limit of the 
right of the well owners would be the small acreage which 
had previously been irrigated, a very small water right. 
Many have :hot been pumped in twenty years. Eighty-
seven of the remaining- 284 'vells were domestic or stock 
\\Tatering wells that are no cause for concern. (Tr. 128 to 
130). Of course numerous wells have been drilled and 
in use since 1940, but in expressing the opinion that there 
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is ·not sufficient water to satisfy all well rights the state 
engineer takes into consideration the use of all of the 
foregoing 371 wells, notwithstanding in 1946 only 23 were 
being used as irrigation wells and many had not been used 
for upwards of t'venty years. 
It is well settled that the fraud involved must 
relate to facts then existing or which have pre-
viously existed. Citing 12 R. C. L. 254; annotation 
in 51 A. L. R. at page 49. Nielson vs. Leamington 
Mines and Exploration Corporation, 48 Pac. (2nd) 
439, at page 442, 87 "Qtah 69. 
·Since there was no shortage of water in 1945 when 
the contract was made, and in 1946 when permission to 
drill wells was given to Thompson and Frailey, and since 
all the evidence shows without doubt that water was avail-
able at that ti·me, irrespective of what might happen in 
the years to come, the above principle of law laid qown 
by this court in the above cited Nielson case is applicable. 
"\Ve insist that the· plaintiff himself believes water 
1s available for the irrigation of the lan~s in question. 
If he did not and does not think so then why did he and 
Thompson drill the wells that have been drilled~ Why 
have they so strenuously insisted on the right to retain 
all of the water filings~ If there is no water available 
to irrigate land, the applications have no value, yet plain-
tiff thin~s they have a value of excess of $3000.00, be· 
cause under the decision of the court he could collect such 
an amount which is the down payment 'vith interest to 
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date, by assigning the water applications. Plaintiff con-
tends there is no 'vater available under the g-round pur-
chased from 1\'IcGarry but available under the state 
ground and Sevy gTound which he has purchased. He 
seems to contend there is no water available under the 
application for use on the McGarry ground but that the 
water is available under the same applications for use on 
other ground. 
The very actions and course of conduct of plaintiff 
belies the contention that he ever believed his present 
claims to be true. Why did he not rescind the contract 
in March, 1946, when the state .engineer advised him the 
applications would not be approved 1 Why did he request 
permission to put down the two wells 1. Why did Thomp-
son apply for and procure a homestead entry, anrl why 
did plaintiff purchase state land and other land, and then 
apply for a change of place and use and point of diver-
sion and subsequently drill wells on such other land 1 
Why did plaintiff make a proposition to defendant to 
modify the contract and purchase only 320 acres' Why 
did he write the state engineer, through his counsel, that 
he had decided to let the land go back and forfeit his con-
tract, but first he wanted to move the wells from the 
ground? Why did he write the state engineer on May 
23rd;1946, as follows: "I would like to write you in ref-
erence to the two wells you have allowed me to drill. In-
sofar as transferring location from some ground I am 
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under contract to. McGarry for, ·to some ground I am 
buying from Heber Sevy of Cedar would this distance of 
change of location be permissible. Could McGarry pro-
hibit me from doing this. I am now hauling pipe and 
well pumps * * * ~ '' Why did he write the state engineer 
on July 19th, 1946, ''enclosed is letter from Is om. It is 
also the reason I need some good advice whether to try 
to purchase some of the land from McGarry or to forget 
it entirely and try and put the two wells you are allowing 
me on some other ground I can purchase from l\1r. Sevy~'' 
Why did plaintiff make demand on ·McGarry as late as 
the ·summer or fall of 1946 to produce an abstract of title, 
with the idea, so he said, that if the title was all right he 
could always change the wells back to the McGarry tract' 
Are these things consistent with the belief that there \Yas 
no water available~ And do they not show an utterly in-
consistent' and vaccilating policy~ 
It is extremely doubtful whether the statements made 
by defendant concerning availability of water, under all 
the circumstances in this case, can be classed as anything 
excepting mere expressions of opinion, or trader's talk, 
and therefore not actionable. The general principle of 
law that a mere expression of opinion, however erroneous, 
will not warrant cancellation of a contract, is so well es-
tablished that citation of authority is unnecessary. Ho\V-
ever, it is not necessary to invoke this doctrine because 
we fail to find any statements or representations made by 
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defendant that are untrue. rrhe testimony is to the effect 
that whenever and where in the Beryl district wells were 
drilled, long after 1946, water was found available. Frail-
ey does not contend otherwise. He drilled wells himself 
and found water available. We reiterate-that alleged 
fraud invol,~ed in claimed fraudul~nt representations 
must, to be actionable, relate to facts then existing or 
which have previously existed. See Nielson case, supra. 
This case also holds, citing ample authority therein, that 
a statement .as to a future act or as to the future conduct 
of a person would be in the nature of a mere opinion and 
therefore not actionable. See also Ackerman vs. Bram-
well Inv. Co., 12 Pac. (2nd) 623, 80 Utah 52. 
An actionable representation must relate to 
past ·or existing facts and cannot consist of unful-
filled predications, or erroneous conjectures as to 
future events. 26 C. J. page 1087, Sec. 25, citing 
many cases from all jurisdictions. Also, 37 C. J. 8. 
page 231, Sec. 11. 
As heretofore pointed out, the only testimony in the 
record concerning the claimed misrepresentations, is the 
evidence of. the plaintiff which was controverted by the 
defendant. It does not meet the legal requirement that 
fraud must be proved by evidence that .is clear and con-
vincing. 
To support a rescission of the contract or can-
cellation of the mortgage, the evidence should be 
clear and convincing in character, and the prepon-
derance of evidence support him who claims the 
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right to rescind. The rule is stated in Ferrell vs. 
WisuJell, 45 Utah 202, 143 Pac. 582-3 as follows: 
We have no right to overlook the whol~some rule 
that where deeds or contracts are sought to be va-
cated and set aside upon the ground of fraud and 
deceit, the burden of proving the alleged fraud is 
upon him who asserts it; moreover, that the fraua 
must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Taylor vs. Moore, 51 Pac. (2nd) 222, 87 Utah 
493. 
See also: 
Greco vs. Graco, 39 Pac. (2nd) 318, 85 Utah 241. 
Lane vs. Peterson, 251 Pac. 37 4, 68 Utah 585. 
Nielson vs. Lea1nington, etc., 4f? Pac. (2nd) 439, 
at pages 441-2, 87 Utah 69. 
By defendant's cross-complaint he seeks the judg-
ment of this court that the contract be declared and deter-
mined to have been abandoned by plaintiff. It is alleged 
that plaintiff ha~ not paid the taxes on the premises, and 
that he failed to crop and till the acreage contemplated 
by the applications for appropriation of 'vater for which 
drilling permits have been issued, and has failed to make 
any paYIDrents due unde! the terms of the contract. By 
his reply the plaintiff admits he did not pay the taxes 
and admits he has not tilled or cropped any acreage or 
paid any money in excess of the down payment, but al-
leges he is not obligated to drill any wells on the land de-
scribed in the contract or to harvest any crops. (R. 40). 
Clearly the defendant was entitled to the holding of the 
trial court that the contract has been abandoned by plain-
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tiff and should be determined to be forfeited. In fact, 
plaintiff testified that he had no intention of proceeding 
further with the contract. 
Defendant submits that there has been no fraudu-
lent misrepresentations and no actionable misrepresenta-
tions; that the plaintiff has failed in the burden of proof; 
that by his actions and conduct he has affirmed the con-
tract even though it be found there were fraudulent mis-
representations; that plaintiff cannot retain some of the 
benefits under the contract and then repudiate the con-
tract; that any right of rescission, if there ever was such 
a right, has been lost and waived through failure to act 
timely and that plaintiff cannot prevail in this cause on 
any theory whatsoever. Defendant submits, moreover, 
that to permit the plaintiff to regain the money paid some_ 
two years ago, and repudiate the cqntract so that he 
might evade the provisions thereof and retain all of the 
water applications and filings, would be inequitable and 
permit plaintiff to enrich himself at the expense of de-
fendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, WILSON AND CLINE, 
.4ttorneys for Respondent: 
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